As observed by the French Revolution, social cooperation can also break down when society's sense of justice is eroded. This is clarified by cooperation researchers Yuval Harari and Robert Axelrod.
The French Revolution is one of history's great examples of how a breakdown of justice in society can destroy cooperation, undermine social cohesion and ultimately lead to instability. This period of social, political and economic transformation touches on key themes in game theory and cooperation, providing a real example of what can happen when justice and reciprocity break down at the system level. Robert Axelrod's research on cooperative game theoretic strategies and Yuval Noah Harari's findings on social bonds established on narratives, fiction, and belief reveal the need for justice as a basis for maintaining order and cooperation in complex social systems. In analyzing the causes that contributed to the French Revolution, we see that justice, or the absence of it, determines whether a society can maintain cooperation or whether it will dissolve and change.
The Breakdown of Justice in the Ancien Régime
Before the French Revolution, French society was organized under a rigid hierarchy called the Ancien Régime ("Old Order"), which divided people into three classes: the clergy, the nobility and the commoners (Third Estate). This organization placed most of the people in the Third Estate, subjecting them to high taxes and limited legal rights, while the clergy and nobility enjoyed privileges and tax exemption. As Harari explains in Sapiens, human civilizations rely on shared myths or "fictions" to sustain large-scale cooperation. In pre-revolutionary France, this myth was the divine right of monarchs and the validity of a hierarchical social structure. However, as things deteriorated for the Third Estate, confidence in these structures waned. Economic hardship, hunger and growing inequality emphasized the lack of reciprocity between the ruling classes and the people, weakening the judicial system and undermining collective trust in the legitimacy of the hierarchy.
In game theory terms, the relationship between the ruling class and the Third Estate can be seen as a breakdown in the cooperative strategy known as “tit-for-tat”. Robert Axelrod's research on the Iterative Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) shows how cooperation can emerge and persist if individuals adopt a strategy of reciprocating cooperation or betrayal. But for tit-for-tat to be effective, both parties need to be able to mutually influence outcomes. In France, the nobility's refusal to reimburse the Third Estate for their contributions and cooperation, and their avoidance of shared costs, created an unsustainable cycle of exploitation. The demands and grievances of the Third Estate were ignored, undermining trust and causing an irreversible breakdown in cooperation.
Justice: A Framework for Systemwide Cooperation
Justice is not just a moral concept. It is a necessary mechanism for cooperation in society. Axelrod's tit-for-tat or similar strategies show how reciprocity works in small groups or individual interactions, where players can directly reward or punish each other's actions. But as societies grow, justice systems function as a larger form of tit-for-tat, imposing standards that ensure social behavior is predictable and fair. In large, complex systems, justice systems act as proxies for direct reciprocity, establishing norms that individuals rely on to guarantee fairness even in indirect interactions. This institutionalized justice provides people with confidence that cooperation will be rewarded, and abuse punished, allowing larger communities to function properly.
In pre-revolutionary France, the court system favored elites, leaving ordinary people with few options to resolve grievances or hold their rulers accountable. The French people's attempts to petition the king and change the tax system through parliament were rebuffed, demonstrating the inability of the justice system to provide a basis for fair reciprocity. As Axelrod's game theory models imply, without the promise of reciprocity, cooperation becomes untenable and drives individuals and organizations to seek justice elsewhere. The Third Estate's frustration and subsequent rejection of the Old Order demonstrates the failure of a system incapable of delivering justice or sustaining reciprocal cooperation.
Shared Narratives as Social Glue
While Axelrod's tit-for-tat sheds light on the mechanics of human cooperation, Yuval Noah Harari's ideas about shared narratives help explain how societies build large-scale cooperation through belief systems. Harari argues that the ability of humans to cooperate flexibly in large groups based on shared fictions (or abstractions) such as rules, money and national identity is extraordinary. These shared beliefs in these fictions are the foundation of social order and provide a common understanding that fosters trust and cooperation within the larger society. In pre-revolutionary France, the dominant fiction defended the divine right of kings and social order as irrefutable truths. But as social inequalities grew, the French people lost faith in their shared narratives and the "fiction" that held them together was shattered.
The French Revolution shows how faith-based cooperation can crumble when the underlying fiction does not support the common good. Without a unifying narrative that legitimized the social order, the French people could no longer see the ruling elite as just or the system as egalitarian. The collapse of this shared narrative, combined with a lack of justice, tore society apart and unleashed revolutionary forces that eventually overthrew the monarchy. Harari's findings on the importance of shared beliefs are consistent with Axelrod's concepts and emphasize that large-scale cooperation requires not only personal reciprocity but also a social commitment to perceived just institutions.
Complex social systems, such as countries and nations, require both local interactions (tit-for-tat) and larger justice systems capable of dealing with large-scale problems. Justice is critical to ensure predictability, stability and a shared sense of fairness. When justice is lacking or seen as skewed, trust erodes, and cooperation breaks down. In France, the lack of justice led to factionalism and ultimately to the violence of the Reign of Terror, when both former officials and ordinary civilians were summarily and arbitrarily executed in the name of "revolutionary justice". This turbulent period shows how, without a stable legal system, complex societies can become cycles of revenge and retribution. The lessons of the French Revolution tell us that justice is a critical component for maintaining cooperation in complex systems. A functioning judicial system strengthens the social contract by making people feel safe and treated fairly. Without justice, cooperation suffers, and social order becomes fragile, as the collapse of the Ancien Régime shows.
Axelrod's findings about tit-for-tat or similar strategies show how reciprocity promotes trust and stability in smaller-scale encounters, while Harari's emphasis on shared fictions suggests how large-scale cooperation depends on just, unifying narratives. These approaches provide a recipe for societies to sustain resilience and cohesion. Conversely, when justice is not balanced, even the most established orders can quickly descend into chaos.
In complex systems, justice is more than an ideal or just an ethical concern. It is the foundation or glue of the complex web of interactions and social cooperation that allows societies to flourish and sustain themselves.
Reading
- Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books. 1984
- Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Harper Perennial; Reprint edition (May 15, 2018)